Using Immigration Law to Protect Human Rights: A Legislative Proposal by Aceves, William J. & Hoffman, Paul L.
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 20 Issue 4 
1999 
Using Immigration Law to Protect Human Rights: A Legislative 
Proposal 
William J. Aceves 
California Western School of Law 
Paul L. Hoffman 
Bostwick and Hoffman, LLP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William J. Aceves & Paul L. Hoffman, Using Immigration Law to Protect Human Rights: A Legislative 
Proposal, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 657 (1999). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol20/iss4/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
USING IMMIGRATION LAW TO PROTECT
HUMAN RIGHTS:
A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
William J. Aceves*
Paul L. Hoffinan**
INTRODU CTION .................................................................................. 658
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NAZI PERSECUTION
AND GENOCIDE PROVISIONS ...................................................... 662
II. A REVIEW OF THE NAZI PERSECUTION AND GENOCIDE
P RO VISIO N S ............................................................................... 669
A. Ineligibility for Admission ................................................. 669
B. Preclusion from Waiver of Inadmissibility ........................ 670
C . D enaturalization ............................................................... 671
D . D ep ortation ...................................................................... 672
E. Ineligibility for Withholding of Removal on Grounds
of Anticipated Persecution ................................................ 673
F. Ineligibility for Voluntary Departure ................................ 674
G. Ineligibility for Cancellation of Removal ........................... 675
H . C onclusion ........................................................................ 676
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ACT OF PERSECUTION? ...................... 676
IV. A PROPOSAL To PRECLUDE IMMIGRATION RELIEF To ALIENS
WHO COMMIT GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ................... 682
C O N CLU SIO N ..................................................................................... 69 1
APPENDIX I PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ...................................... 693
P O STSCRIPT ........................................................................................ 694
* William J. Aceves is Associate Professor of Law at California Western School of
Law.
** Paul L. Hoffman is partner at Bostwick and Hoffman, LLP and former Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Amnesty International-USA. Mr. Hoffman was one of the attor-
neys representing the plaintiffs in Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo. The views expressed in this article
do not represent the official views of Amnesty International or Amnesty International-USA.
The authors would like to thank Jamie Cooper and Lilia Velasquez for their comments
on earlier drafts. Professor Aceves would like to thank Ricardo Gibert, Esra Krause, Patricia
Lavermicocca, Phyllis Wignall, and Heather Zuber for their research assistance. The authors
also acknowledge the assistance of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Office of
Special Investigations, and the Canadian Department of Justice. All opinions and errors
remain the responsibility of the authors.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Not only is United States citizenship a "high privilege," it is a
priceless treasure.'
INTRODUCTION
In September 1990, three Ethiopian refugees filed a lawsuit in fed-
eral district court in Atlanta against Kelbessa Negewo, a former high
ranking government official from Ethiopia residing in the United
States.2 The lawsuit was filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which
provides federal district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over tort
actions filed by aliens alleging violations of international law.3 The
plaintiffs alleged that Negewo had ordered and participated in numerous
acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment against
them in the late 1970s while they lived in Ethiopia.4
In Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, the District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia found Negewo liable for human rights violations.5 The dis-
trict court made several findings of fact, including the following
description of acts committed against one of the plaintiffs:
On January 6, 1978, plaintiff Abebe-Jiri was arrested again
along with her 16 year old sister Yesharge. She was taken to the
same prison. At the prison in Subzone 10, she was interrogated
and tortured in the presence of defendant Negewo and several
other men for a period of several hours. She was told to take off
her clothes. Her arms and legs were then bound and she was
whipped with a wire on her legs and her back. She suffered se-
vere pain. She was repeatedly threatened with death if she did
not reveal the location of a gun. At all times, the interrogation
1. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
2. Complaint, Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, Case No. I:90-cv-2010-GET (N.D. GA. Sept. 13,
1990).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The Alien Tort Claims Act provides that "[tihe district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The term "law of nations"
has been interpreted to refer to "international law." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 Introductory Note (1987).
4. In the mid-1970s, Ethiopia was ruled by a military dictatorship known as the
"Dergue." These acts were committed during a brutal campaign of repression referred to as
the Red Terror. Under this campaign, local militia groups threatened, punished and executed
any groups opposed to the government. See generally AFRICA WATCH, ETHIOPIA: RECKONING
UNDER THE LAW (1994); ALEXANDER DE WAAL, EvIL DAYS: THIRTY YEARS OF WAR AND
FAM, E IN ETHIOPIA (1991).
5. Findings of Fact, Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, Case No. I:90-cv-2010-GET (N.D. GA.
Aug. 2, 1993).
[Vol. 20:657
Summer 19991 Using Immigration Law to Protect Human Rights 659
and torture of plaintiff Abebe-Jiri was conducted in a humiliat-
ing and degrading manner.
Defendant Negewo personally supervised at least some part of
the interrogation and torture of plaintiff Abebe-Jiri. He also per-
sonally interrogated her and participated directly in some of the
acts of torture of plaintiff Abebe-Jiri.6
Based upon these findings, the district court concluded that Negewo had
committed acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment. Accordingly, the court awarded the plaintiffs compensatory and
punitive damages in the amount of $1.5 million. On appeal, the Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.7
While Negewo's case was on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereinafter "INS") approved
Negewo's pending application for naturalization and granted him U.S.
citizenship.' Indeed, the INS was informed of the civil action and judg-
ment against Negewo prior to its approval of his naturalization
application.9 The ease with which Negewo entered the United States, the
INS decision to approve Negewo's application for naturalization, and
the difficulty now facing the INS in seeking to revoke his naturalization
decree, reveal glaring and troubling limitations in current immigration
law and practice. This case is not unique. Other aliens who have com-
mitted gross human rights violations have also gained entry into the
United States and been granted immigration relief.'o
Currently, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as
amended, precludes any form of immigration relief to aliens who par-
ticipated in Nazi persecution." These provisions were established by
Congress in 1978 to prevent the entry of Nazi war criminals into the
United States and to facilitate their deportation if they resided in the
United States. 2 In 1990, Congress extended these provisions to include
6. ld. at 3.
7. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
8. See How a Torture Figure Becomes a Citizen, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT,
March 2, 1998.
9. Interview with Paul L. Hoffman, Managing Partner, Bostwick & Hoffman, LLP
(Sept. 15, 1999).
10. See Steve Fainaru, U.S. Is a Haven For Suspected War Criminals, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 2, 1999, at Al; Steve Fainaru, Suspect in 'Cleansing' By Serbs Living in Vermont, Bos-
TON GLOBE, May 3, 1999, at Al; Steve Fainaru, Rights Violators Exploit U.S. Immigration
System, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1999, at AI.
11. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, is codified in Title 8 of
the United States Code. 8 U.S.C. ch. 12 (1999). Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations
further elaborates on these provisions. See generally 8 C.F.R. (1999).
12. See generally, Bruce Einhorn et al., The Prosecution of War Criminals and Violators
of Human Rights in the United States, 19 WMTTIER L. REv. 281 (1997); Matthew Lippman,
Michigan Journal of International Law
aliens who participated in acts of genocide." All forms of immigration
relief are unavailable to aliens who have committed these acts. In addi-
tion, the Office of Special Investigations was established to investigate
and prosecute aliens who participated in acts of Nazi persecution.
The rationale for these stringent provisions is straightforward.' 4 Per-
petrators of human rights violations should be held accountable for their
actions regardless of when or where such acts took place. At a mini-
mum, they should not be allowed to seek refuge in the United States nor
should they benefit from any social, political, or economic opportunities
provided in the United States. Accordingly, the Nazi persecution and
genocide provisions preclude admission and facilitate the deportation of
aliens who committed these acts. '" To date, these provisions have played
an important role in preventing the entry of former Nazis into the United
States and facilitating the deportation of former Nazis already present in
the United States. Similar immigration restrictions on former Nazi per-
secutors have been adopted in several other countries.
While the Immigration and Nationality Act precludes any form of
immigration relief to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who
committed acts of genocide, there are no comparable restrictions that
apply to aliens who have committed other gross violations of human
Fifty Years After Auschwitz: Prosecutions of Nazi Death Camp Defendants, 11 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 199 (1996); Marc J. Hertzberg, Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals: A Call for the
Immediate Prosecution of Living Nazi War Criminals, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 181
(1993/1994); Jeffrey N. Mausner, Apprehending and Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in the
United States, 15 NOVA L. REv. 747 (1991); Elliott M. Abramson, Reflections on the Un-
thinkable: Standards Relating to the Denaturalization and Deportation of Nazis and Those
Who Collaborated with the Nazis During World War 11, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311 (1989);
Robert A. Cohen, United States Exclusion and Deportation of Nazi War Criminals: The Act
of October30, 1978, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLITICS 101 (1980).
13. See generally, Paul John Chrisopoulos, Giving Meaning to the Term "Genocide" as
It Applies to U.S. Immigration Policy, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & ComP. L.J. 925 (1995).
14. See generally, ALAN ROSENBAUM, PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS (1993); AL-
LAN RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA (1984).
15. See generally, Jeffrey Mausner, Apprehending and Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals
in the United States, 15 NOVA. L. REv. 747 (1991); Stephen Massey, Individual Responsibil-
ity for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REV. 97 (1986); Robert
Cohen, United States Exclusion and Deportation of Nazi War Criminals: The Act of October
30, 1978, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 101 (1980).
16. For example, Canada has developed an extensive program for pursuing war crimi-
nals. Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Public Report: Canada's War Crimes
Program (1998). Other countries have developed similar restrictions, including Australia and
Great Britain. See also, Matthew Lippman, The Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United
States and in Other Anglo-American Legal Systems, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1998); Sympo-
sium, Prosecutor's Symposium: New Jurisdiction, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1992);
Symposium, Time and Distance: The Challenge of Prosecuting Holocaust-Related Crimes,
12 B.C. TIIRD WORLD L.J. 37 (1992); Symposium, Prosecuting World War II Persecutors:
Efforts at an Era's End, 12 B.C. TimD WORLD L.J. 199 (1992).
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rights. For example, aliens who have committed acts of torture or ex-
trajudicial killing may be eligible for some forms of immigration relief.
In addition to these substantive limitations, the ability to prevent aliens
who have committed gross human rights violations from entering the
United States is also hampered by institutional problems and the lack of
an organizational commitment to target these individuals. Thus, any
presumed immigration restrictions that may apply to aliens who have
committed human rights violations are essentially eviscerated by the
lack of effective implementation and enforcement mechanisms.
This Article suggests that the rationale underlying the Nazi persecu-
tion and genocide provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
should be extended to all cases where aliens have participated in gross
human rights violations. Quite simply, the logic underlying these provi-
sions applies with equal rigor and intensity to all forms of human rights
violations regardless of where or when they took place. Immigration
relief is truly a priceless treasure.'7 The United States should not become
a haven for those aliens who have violated the most fundamental norms
of international human rights law. Accordingly, immigration relief must
not be provided to any individual who has committed human rights
atrocities, including acts of slavery, torture, extrajudicial killing, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or other forms of persecution.
Part I of this Article reviews the legislative history of the Nazi per-
secution and genocide provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. Part II then examines several provisions that preclude immigration
relief to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who committed
acts of genocide. Specifically, it focuses on seven areas where aliens
who have committed these acts are ineligible for immigration relief: (a)
ineligibility for admission; (b) preclusion from waiver of inadmissibil-
ity; (c) denaturalization; (d) deportation; (e) ineligibility for withholding
of removal on grounds of anticipated persecution; (f) ineligibility for
voluntary departure; and (g) ineligibility for cancellation of removal.
Since "persecution" constitutes an integral element in the Nazi persecu-
tion and genocide provisions, Part Ili reviews the standards used by the
courts to determine whether an alien has engaged in persecution, thereby
precluding immigration relief.
Finally, Part IV of this Article proposes draft legislation to amend
the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to preclude all forms of
immigration relief to aliens who commit gross violations of human
rights such as acts of slavery, torture, extrajudicial killing, war crimes,
17. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268
(1967); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963); Luria v. United States,
231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
Michigan Journal of International Law
crimes against humanity, or other forms of persecution. This legislative
proposal is designed to complement existing provisions concerning ali-
ens who committed acts of Nazi persecution or participated in acts of
genocide. In addition to this legislative amendment, Part IV proposes
restructuring U.S. government institutions and procedures to better ad-
dress the problem of modern day atrocities.
Gross violations of human rights, regardless of where or when they
occur, always leave physical and emotional scars on their victims. On
many occasions, these acts leave an even more troubling legacy-
nameless, faceless, and lifeless victims. The legislative proposal out-
lined in this Article provides a voice for these victims and ensures that
egregious violations of fundamental human rights do not go unan-
swered.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NAZI PERSECUTION
AND GENOCIDE PROVISIONS
Following World War II, Congress enacted the Displaced Persons
Act of 1948 (hereinafter "DPA") as a mechanism to allow relief to per-
sons displaced by the war, without regard to immigration quota
restrictions.'8 The DPA expressly prohibited the issuance of a visa "to
any person who is or has been a member of, or participated in, any
movement which is or has been hostile to the United States or the form
of government of the United States."' 9 The DPA also limited its appli-
cation to those individuals who were considered "eligible displaced
persons" by the International Refugee Organization. 0 Under the terms of
the International Refugee Organization's Constitution, the following
persons were not considered "eligible displaced persons" and, therefore,
were ineligible for assistance:
2. Any other persons who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations
of countries, Members of the United Nations; or
18. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
The Displaced Persons Act and the Refugee Relief Act focused primarily on the admission of
refugees into the United States because of humanitarian concerns. In contrast, the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Acts of 1952 and 1990 contain general immigration provisions. See
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1953) (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104
Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
19. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, supra note 18.
20. Id. at § 2(b).
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(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the out-
break of the Second World War in their operations against the
United Nations.2 '
Under the terms of the DPA, therefore, aliens who assisted in Nazi per-
secution were ineligible for immigration assistance. In 1950, Congress
amended the Displaced Persons Act . Section 13 was amended to ex-
pressly bar the issuance of an entrance visa "to any person who
advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race,
religion, or national origin."
In 1952, the general provisions of the immigration code were sub-
stantially revised by the Immigration and Nationality Act." Unlike the
Displaced Persons Act, the 1952 Act did not explicitly prohibit immi-
gration relief for aliens who had assisted in Nazi persecution. Rather, it
provided for the exclusion of aliens who were members of or affiliated
with totalitarian parties such as the Communist Party. This section did
not apply to Nazis. In addition, it precluded admission and authorized
deportation of aliens who, inter alia, had committed acts that constituted
the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude, or who pro-
cured or sought to procure entry by concealment or by willful
misrepresentation of a material fact. Accordingly, a Nazi who assisted in
persecution, but who entered the United States without concealment or
misrepresentation, was not subject to deportation under the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952.
The Refugee Relief Act (hereinafter "RRA") was adopted in 1953 to
24replace the Displaced Persons Act. The RRA prohibited entry to any
alien "who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any
person or group of persons because of race, religion, or national ori-
gin."25 This language differed slightly from the Displaced Persons Act
by adding the word "personally" with regard to advocating or assisting
in persecution. The RRA did not specifically exclude aliens who as-
sisted in Nazi persecution from entering the United States. Accordingly,
the RRA did not exclude an alien because of mere membership in the
Nazi party. The RRA expired in December, 1956. Between 1956 and
1978, therefore, the United States did not specifically preclude immi-
gration relief to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution.
In 1978, Congress began considering legislation to expressly ex-
clude aliens who participated in Nazi persecution and to facilitate their
21. International Refugee Constitution, Chapter XXIX, annex I, part II, § 2(a) and (b).
22. 1950 Amendment to Displaced Persons Act, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219, 227 (1950).
23. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, supra note 18.
24. Refugee Relief Act, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400 (1953).
25. § 14(a), 67 Stat. at 406.
Michigan Journal of International Law
deportation. In testimony before the House, Congresswoman Elizabeth
Holtzman (D-NY) indicated that legislation was necessary to fill an un-
acceptable gap in U.S. immigration law. According to Congresswoman
Holtzman:
Since 1952 there has been no provision in our regular immigra-
tion law to exclude or deport Nazi war criminals who persecuted
people for racial, religious or other reasons. Enactment of this
bill would close this loophole and put our Government squarely
on record as denying sanctuary in the United States to Nazi war
criminals.26
Congressman Joshua Eilberg (D-PA), Chairman of the House Subcom-
mittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, stated that
"[t]he enactment of this bill would serve as a clear reaffirmation of this
country's commitment to the most basic of human rights-that is, the
right to live one's life and practice one's belief without the fear of perse-
cution. 27 According to the House Report, this proposed legislation was
consistent with the principles enunciated in a number of international
agreements including the United Nations Charter, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Accords. 28 The Report also
cited the Nuremberg tribunals, which recognized that persecution be-
cause of political, racial or religious grounds was contrary to
fundamental principles of humanity.' 9
In 1978, Congress enacted the Holtzman Amendment to expressly
exclude aliens who participated in Nazi persecution from entering the
United States and to facilitate their deportation. ° The Holtzman
Amendment applies to any alien who, under the direction of or in asso-
ciation with the Nazi government of Germany, ordered, incited, assisted,
or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of
race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, and where such acts
26. 124 CONG. REc. H31646, H31647 (Sept. 26, 1978).
27. Id. at H31647.
28. H.R. REp. No. 95-1452, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4702-
4703.
29. Id. at 4704-4705. Several members of Congress appended their dissenting views to
the House Report. Id. at 4017. They identified four principal concerns. First, they did not
believe that the proposed legislation was necessary. Second, the legislation failed to define
the term "persecution." Third, they indicated that the bill was inflexible and provides no
opportunity for discretionary relief. Finally, they expressed concern that the legislation was
unconstitutional because it was akin to an ex post facto law and may constitute a bill of at-
tainder as well.
30. Holtzman Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (1978).
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were committed between March 23, 1933 and May 8, 1945.3' The pri-
mary goal of the Holtzman Amendment was to preclude admission and
facilitate the deportation of aliens who participated in Nazi persecution.
Under both the Displaced Persons Act and the Refugee Relief Act, for-
mer Nazis were ineligible for admission into the United States as well as
other forms of immigration relief. In cases where aliens entered the
United States under these provisions, prosecution was arguably straight-
forward since these individuals were statutorily barred from gaining
immigration relief. In practice, however, prosecution was troublesome
due to procedural and administrative limitations.32 In cases where entry
took place under the normal procedures of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952, prosecution was even more difficult because the Act
did not bar Nazis until the Holtzman Amendment was adopted in 1978."3
Accordingly, the Holtzman Amendment resolved an important limita-
tion in U.S. immigration law.
In addition, the Holtzman Amendment precludes immigration relief
in several other areas. It prevents aliens who participated in Nazi perse-
cution from being eligible to receive visas and excludes them from
admission into the United States. It also prevents these aliens from
seeking waiver of exclusion. Finally, it precludes the Attorney General
from authorizing withholding of deportation or granting voluntary de-
parture to aliens who have committed such acts.
In 1990, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1990 that retained the provisions of the Holtzman Amendment and
added provisions that precluded immigration relief to aliens who par-
ticipated in genocide.4 Specifically, these new provisions prohibit
immigration relief to aliens who engaged in conduct that is defined as
31. An earlier version of the bill would have applied "to exclude from admission to the
United States aliens who have persecuted any person on the basis of race, religion, national
origin, or political opinion and to facilitate the deportation of such aliens who have been
admitted into the United States." H.R. Rep. No. 95-1452, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700. The bill was revised and limited to aliens who participated in Nazi per-
secutions because of concern that the earlier version was too broad. 124 Cong. Rec. H31648.
For criticism of this earlier bill, see Hunting Witches at the Border Again, N.Y TIMEs, July
30, 1978, § IV at 22, col. 1; A New Congressional Witch Hunt, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1978, at
8, col. 1.
32. See Kreig, Hunting Nazis: Trying for Immigration Service, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6, 1978,
at 5; Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizen-
ship, & Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th. Cong. 1 (1977).
33. According to a former Director of the Office of Special Investigations, "[in those
cases, we produced the State Department officials who had issued the visas; they testified
that they had the discretion to deny a visa to anyone who, in their opinion, would not have
been a desirable immigrant, and that this certainly included Nazi war criminals." Ryan, supra
note 14, at 248.
34. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, supra note 18, at § 212(A)(3)(E).
Michigan Journal of International Law
genocide for purposes of the International Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide.35 According to the State Department,
"[a]lthough no specific legislative background could be found, Congress
apparently intended to exclude any alien whose behavior, though similar
to that found excludable under the Nazi provisions, violated more uni-
versal standards. 36
Implementation of these provisions is conducted by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, the Department of Justice, and the Depart-
ment of State. Under the current system, an alien seeking an immigrant
or nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States is required to prepare
and submit a visa application to U.S. officials. Both applications ask the
alien to disclose whether they have participated in Nazi persecution or
participated in genocide. 7 In addition, an interagency watch list identi-
fies individuals suspected of having participated in Nazi persecution or
acts of genocide. The names of aliens seeking visas are checked against
this list, known as the Automated Visa Lookout System. Furthermore,
all cases of possible ineligibility under the Nazi persecution or genocide
provisions require a security advisory opinion from the State Depart-
35. The Genocide Convention defines genocide as any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
36. U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, § 40.35 (b), at n. 1.
37. The Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration asks aliens whether they
"participated in Nazi persecutions or genocide," whether they "engaged in genocide,"
whether they "are a member or representative of a terrorist organization as currently desig-
nated by the U.S. Secretary of State," or whether they have committed a crime involving
moral turpitude. In contrast, the Nonimmigrant Visa Application asks aliens whether they
have "ever ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion under the control, direct
or indirect, of the Nazi Government of Germany, or of the government of any area occupied
by, or allied with, the Nazi Government of Germany, or have you ever participated in geno-
cide," or whether they are "a member or representative of a terrorist organization." Under the
Nonimmigrant Visa Application, therefore, an individual who has committed human rights
violations is not obligated to disclose such information on the application. Finally, the Appli-
cation for Asylum asks aliens to disclose whether "you, your spouse or child(ren) ever
caused harm or suffering to any person because of his or her race, religion, nationality,
membership in particular social group or political opinion, or ever ordered or assisted in such
acts."
[Vol. 20:657
Summer 1999] Using Immigration Law to Protect Human Rights 667
ment.38 No visa may be issued until the State Department submits its
advisory opinion. If the State Department determines that an alien has
participated in acts of Nazi persecution or genocide, a visa may not be
issued. Moreover, there is no waiver relief available to either nonimmi-
grants or immigrants who have participated in Nazi persecution or
committed acts of genocide once a determination has been rendered by
the State Department.39
If an alien arrives at a U.S. port-of-entry, the INS also conducts an
eligibility determination by checking the names of such aliens against a
separate watch list, known as the National Automated Immigration
Lookout System.40 Aliens who do not require a visa because of their na-
tionality must fill out a Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Form.4' The form
requires the alien to disclose whether they were ever involved in acts of
Nazi persecution or genocide.42
To facilitate enforcement of U.S. immigration laws against alleged
participants in Nazi persecution, the Attorney General established the
Office of Special Investigations (hereinafter "OSI") in 1979. 43 OSI was
granted "the primary responsibility for detecting, investigating, and,
where appropriate, taking legal action to deport, denaturalize, or prose-
cute any individual who was admitted as an alien into or became a
naturalized citizen of the United States and who had assisted the Nazis
by persecuting any person because of race, religion, national origin, or
political opinion. 44 Specifically, the OSI shall:
1. Review pending and new allegations that individuals, who
prior to and during World War II, under the supervision or
38. Foreign Affairs Manual, supra note 36, at § 40.35(a) and (b).
39. Id.
40. Immigration Law and Procedure at § 2.05[2][a]. See also, Senate Judiciary Comm.,
Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism & Gov't Info. (1998) (Statement of Walter D. Cadman).
41. In 1986, a visa waiver program was established for visitors from certain countries. 8
C.F.R. § 217.1-.2 (1999). The program is limited to countries that provide reciprocal rights
to U.S. nationals. Under this program, a visa is not required from certain countries including:
Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. Aliens from these countries must submit a nonimmigrant visa waiver form upon
arrival at a U.S. port-of-entry.
42. Form 1-94W.
43. Transfer of Functions of the Special Litigation Unit Within the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice to the Criminal Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, Order of the U.S. Attorney General, No. 851-79 (Sept. 4, 1979). See also,
GAO Report on Nazi War Criminals in the United States: Oversight Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong. 1 (1985).
44. Transfer of Functions of the Special Litigation Unit, supra note 43, at 1.
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in association with the Nazi government in Germany, its al-
lies, and other affiliated governments, ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person because of race, religion, national origin or political
opinion;
2. Investigate, as appropriate, each allegation to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to file a complaint to
revoke citizenship, support a show cause order to deport, or
seek an indictment or any other judicial process against any
such individuals;
3. Maintain liaison with foreign prosecution, investigation and
intelligence offices;
4. Use appropriate Government agency resources and person-
nel for investigations, guidance, information and analysis;
and
5. Direct and coordinate the investigation, prosecution, and
any other legal actions instituted in these cases with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the United States Attorneys Offices, and
other relevant Federal agencies.45
The OSI staff consists of attorneys, investigators and historians. To date,
the Office of Special Investigations has investigated over 1,600 people
and filed approximately 100 cases seeking denaturalization or deporta-
46tion of former Nazis. Perhaps the most noticeable foreign national
denied entry because of his Nazi past is former U.N. Secretary General
and Austrian President Kurt Waldheim. 47 Recently, the OSI has begun to
use the Nazi persecution statutes to prevent Japanese war criminals from
41
entering the United States.
45. Id. at 3.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998); United States v. Gecas, 120
F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); Schellong v.
I.N.S., 805 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1986).
47. On April 27, 1987, the Attorney General announced that Waldheim's name had been
placed on both the National Immigration and Automated Visa Lookout Systems. See ELI
ROSENBAUM, BETRAYAL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE KURT WALDHEIM INVESTIGATION AND
COVER-UP (1993); Philip Shenon, U.S. Disputes Waldheim Assertions, N.Y. '" MEs, Feb. 17,
1998, at A3; U.S. Bars Kurt Waldheim, Cites Service with Nazis, CHICAGO TRLIBUNE, Apr. 28,
1987, at Cl; U.S. Bars Waldheim Entry Over Charges of Nazi Past; First Head of State to be
Banned, L.A. 'IHmEs, Apr. 27, 1987, at Al.
48. See James Dao, U.S. Bars Japanese Who Admits War Crime, N.Y TIMES, June 27,
1998, at A3; Ronald J. Ostrow, U.S. Bars 2 Repentant Japanese GIs, L.A. TIMEs, June 25,
1998, at A9.
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1I. A REVIEW OF THE NAZI PERSECUTION AND
GENOCIDE PROVISIONS
The Immigration and Nationality Act precludes immigration relief
to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who committed acts of
genocide. Specifically, the Act contains the following restrictions: (a)
ineligibility for admission; (b) preclusion from waiver of inadmissibil-
ity; (c) denaturalization; (d) ineligibility for withholding of removal on
grounds of anticipated persecution; (e) deportation; (f) ineligibility for
voluntary departure; and (g) ineligibility for cancellation of removal.
This list is by no means exhaustive. There are several other provisions
in the Immigration and Nationality Act that also preclude immigration
relief to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who committed
• 49
acts of genocide.
A. Ineligibility for Admission
Aliens who participated in Nazi persecutions or who committed acts
of genocide are ineligible for admission into the United States. As cur-
rently codified, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission.
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are in-
admissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to
receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United
States:
(3) Security and Related Grounds
(E) Participants in Nazi persecutions or genocide.
(i) Participation in Nazi persecutions.
Any alien who, during the period beginning
on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8,
1945, under the direction of, or in associa-
tion with-
(I) the Nazi government of Germany,
49. See also, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (definition of refugee); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)
(eligibility for political asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(l) (eligibility for waiver of any ground
of exclusion for S nonimmigrants); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(1) (eligibility for removal without
further hearings); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (detention and removal of aliens ordered removed);
8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)(A) (temporary protected status); 8 U.S.C § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(ii)(III); 8
U.S.C. § 1255(j)(l)(B) (eligibility for adjustment of status to permanent resident status); 8
U.S.C. § 1259 (record of lawful admission).
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(I) any government in any area occupied by
the military forces of the Nazi govern-
ment of Germany,
(II) any government established with the as-
sistance or cooperation of the Nazi
government of Germany, or
(IV) any government which was an ally of
the Nazi government of Germany, or-
dered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any
person because of race, religion, national
origin, or political opinion is inadmissi-
ble.
(ii) Participation in genocide.
Any alien who has engaged in conduct that
is defined as genocide for purposes of the
International Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide is inadmissi-
ble.
50
B. Preclusion from Waiver of Inadmissibility
The consequences for aliens who participated in Nazi persecutions
or who committed acts of genocide extend far beyond entry restrictions.
For example, the Attorney General has discretion to waive an alien's
ineligibility for admission. However, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) provides
that aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who committed acts
of genocide are precluded from receiving a discretionary waiver of in-
admissibility. This section provides in pertinent part:
Excludable aliens
(d) Temporary admission of nonimmigrants
(1) The Attorney General shall determine whether a
ground for inadmissibility exists with respect to a
nonimmigrant described in section 101(a)(15)(S) of
this title. The Attorney General, in the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretion, may waive the application of
50. Immigration and Nationality Act §212(a)(3)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (1998).
[Vol. 20:657
Summer 1999] Using Immigration Law to Protect Human Rights 671
subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraph
(3)(E)) in the case of a nonimmigrant described in
section 101(a)(15)(S) of this title, if the Attorney Gen-
eral considers it to be in the national interest to do so.
Nothing in this section shall be regarded as prohibiting
the Immigration and Naturalization Service from in-
stituting removal proceedings against an alien
admitted as a nonimmigrant under section
101(a)(15)(S) of this title for conduct committed after
the alien's admission into the United States, or for
conduct or a condition that was not disclosed to the
Attorney General prior to the alien's admission as a
nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(S) of this title.
(3) Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A)
who is applying for a nonimmigrant visa and is known
or believed by the consular officer to be ineligible for
such visa under subsection (a) (other than paragraphs
(3)(A)(i)(I), (3)(A)(ii), (3)(A)(iii), (3)(C), and (3)(E) of
such subsection), may, after approval by the Attorney
General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State
or by the consular officer that the alien be admitted
temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted
such a visa and may be admitted into the United States
temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the
Attorney General, or (B) who is inadmissible under
subsection (a) (other than paragraphs (3)(A)(i)(I),
(3)(A)(ii), (3)(A)(iii), (3)(C), and (3)(E) of such sub-
section), but who is in possession of appropriate
documents or is granted a waiver thereof and is seek-
ing admission, may be admitted into the United States
temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the
Attorney General.
51
C. Denaturalization
The provisions on revocation of naturalization are codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1451." Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) provides that it shall
51. Immigration and Nationality Act §212(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1998).
52. The requirements for naturalization are codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1427. Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1998).
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be the duty of U.S. attorneys for the respective districts to institute de-
naturalization proceedings where an order admitting a person to
citizenship and the certificate of naturalization "were illegally procured
or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrep-
resentation. '53
While this section does not specifically address Nazis or Nazi perse-
cution, it has been used to seek denaturalization of aliens who concealed
or misrepresented their past association with the Nazis during World
War II. 4 It would also apply to aliens who concealed or misrepresented
acts of genocide.
In Fedorenko v. United States, the U.S. government brought a de-
naturalization action against a former Nazi death camp guard who
misrepresented his wartime activities and concealed his Nazi past in his
visa petition and subsequent naturalization application." The Supreme
Court indicated that under the provisions of the immigration code, a visa
obtained through a material misrepresentation is invalid. The Court
found that Fedorenko had failed to satisfy a statutory requirement by
misrepresenting his wartime activities. Accordingly, his citizenship
must be revoked because it was illegally procured. "Our cases have es-
tablished that a naturalized citizen's failure to comply with the statutory
prerequisites for naturalization renders his certificate of citizenship
revocable as 'illegally procured' under 8 U.S.C. § 145 1(a).' 6
D. Deportation
Once an alien is found to be ineligible for immigration benefits, it is
still necessary to deport him if he is present in the United States. Aliens
who were inadmissible at time of entry, who assisted in Nazi persecu-
tion, or who engaged in acts of genocide, are deportable. As currently
codified, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) provides in pertinent part:
53. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1998). The Application for
Naturalization requires an alien to disclose whether he has "at any time, anywhere, ever
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because
of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion."
54. Gordon, Mailman and Yale-Loehr, 7 Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 100.02[3][b][iv][B] (1997). See also Lisa J. Del Pizzo, Not Guilty-But Not Innocent: An
Analysis of the Acquital of John Demjanjuk, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 137 (1995);
Shari B. Gersten, United States v. Kungys: Clarifying the Materiality Standard in Denatu-
ralization Proceedings?, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 429 (1989); Comment, The Denaturalization of
Nazi War Criminals in the United States: Is Justice Being Served?, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169
(1985).
55. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
56. Id. at 514. See also, Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
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(a) Classes of deportable aliens.
Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the
United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be
removed if the alien is within one or more of the following
classes of deportable aliens:
(1) Inadmissible at time of entry or of adjustment of status or
violates status.
(A) Inadmissible aliens.
Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of
status was within one or more of the classes of aliens
inadmissible by the law existing at such time is de-
portable.
(4) Security and related grounds.
(D) Assisted in Nazi persecution or engaged in genocide.
Any alien described in clause (i) or (ii) or section
212(a)(3)(E) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i) or (ii)] is de-
portable.
57
E. Ineligibility for Withholding of Removal on Grounds of
Anticipated Persecution
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), the Attorney General is precluded
from removing an alien to a country where that alien's life or freedom
would be threatened because of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion. However, aliens
who participated in Nazi persecution or who committed acts of genocide
are ineligible for withholding of removal on the grounds of anticipated
persecution. This section, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i), pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed
(B) Countries to which aliens may be removed.
(3) Restriction on removal to a country where alien's
life or freedom would be threatened.
57. Immigration and Nationality Act §237(a)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (1998).
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(A) In general.
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the
Attorney General may not remove an alien
to a country if the Attorney General decides
that the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the
alien's race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
(B) Exception.
Subparagraph (A) does not apply to an alien
deportable under section 237(a)(4)(D) [8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D)] or if the Attorney
General decides that-
(i) the alien ordered, incited, as-
sisted, or otherwise participated
in the persecution of an indi-
vidual because of the
individual's race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a
particular social group, or po-
litical opinion;
58
F. Ineligibility for Voluntary Departure
The Attorney General is authorized to grant an alien who is subject
to removal proceedings the right of voluntary departure. Generally, vol-
untary departure allows an alien the opportunity to leave without the
stigma and five-year bar to entry that attaches to a deportation order.59
Voluntary departure can be requested before removal proceedings or at
the conclusion of removal proceedings. However, aliens who partici-
pated in Nazi persecution or who committed acts of genocide are
ineligible for voluntary departure at either stage.60 This section, codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a), provides in pertinent part:
(a) Certain conditions.
(1) In general.
58. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (1998). But
see 8 C.F.R. Parts 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240, 241, and 253; 22 C.F.R. Part 95.
59. Immigration Law and Procedure, supra note 40, at § 1.04[4][a].
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a) (1998).
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The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily
to depart the United States at the alien's own expense
under this subsection, in lieu of being subject to pro-
ceedings under section 240 or prior to the completion
of such proceedings, if the alien is not deportable un-
der section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section 237 (a)(4)(B).
(b) At conclusion of proceedings.
(1) In general.
The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily
to depart the United States at the alien's own expense
if, at the conclusion of a proceeding under section 240,
the immigration judge enters an order granting volun-
tary departure in lieu of removal and finds that-
(c) the alien is not deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) or
section 237(a)(4);
61
Under these provisions, former Nazi war criminals are ineligible for
voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal proceedings. While
they appear eligible for voluntary departure prior to the conclusion of
removal proceedings, the Attorney General has promulgated adminis-
trative regulations under the authority vested by Section 240B(e) that
62precludes voluntary removal at this stage.
G. Ineligibility for Cancellation of Removal
Finally, aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or otherwise
committed acts of genocide are ineligible for cancellation of removal.
According to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), the Attorney General may cancel
removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from
the United States if the alien: (a) has been an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence for not less than 5 years; (b) has resided in the
United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any
status; and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. How-
ever, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(4) provides that the Attorney General may not
cancel removal of "[a]n alien who is inadmissible under section
212(a)(3) or deportable under section 237(a)(4). 63
61. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a) (1998).
62. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.26(b)(1)(E) (1999).
63. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (1998).
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H. Conclusion
In sum, the Immigration and Nationality Act precludes all forms of
immigration relief to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who
committed acts of genocide. It is important to recognize the broad scope
of this legislation. In the strongest terms, Congress has sought to ensure
that perpetrators of Nazi persecution or genocide find no safe haven in
the United States. With few exceptions, no category of aliens is subject
to more restrictions.
II1. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ACT OF PERSECUTION?
The concept of persecution is an integral component of the Nazi
persecution and genocide provisions. Accordingly, it is useful to con-
64sider what constitutes an act of persecution.
The meaning of the term "persecution" was considered by Congress
during its deliberations of the Holtzman Amendment. 6 The House Re-
port on the Holtzman Amendment discussed the persecution standard
and determined that it could be properly and efficiently administered:
6 6
In the making of a "persecution" determination, emphasis
should be placed on the governmental nature of the conduct in-
volved. Isolated instances of mistreatment on the part of one
individual against another, without Government support or
complicity, would clearly not meet that criterion. Further, it is
important to stress that the conduct envisioned must be of a de-
liberate and severe nature and such that is condemned by
civilized governments, precluding invocation of the
64. A related question involves the treatment of acts of persecution in extradition and
asylum proceedings. See generally, William J.A. Hobson, A Canadian Perspective on the
Political Offence Exception in Relation to War Crimes, 62 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 339 (1991);
Michelle N. Lewis, The Political-Offense Exception: Reconciling the Tension between Hu-
man Rights and International Public Order, 63 GEO. WASH L. REv. 585 (1995).
65. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees provides in Article
I(F) that the provisions of the Convention do not apply to any person with respect to whom
there are serious reasons for considering that "he has committed a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to
make provision in respect of such crimes." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. In turn, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
defined crimes against humanity as including, inter alia, persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 280. For alternative approaches to the persecution standard, see Daniel Stein-
bock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REv. 733 (1998).
66. H.R. REP. No. 95-1452, 95th Cong. 2, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4700, 4706.
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"persecution" language in situations, for example, where gov-
ernmental action is taken pursuant to a statute or rule which has
been properly enacted or established but which later is invali-
dated as being inconsistent with a national constitution or
charter. Such Government action would not constitute
"persecution" for purposes of this bill unless it could be estab-
lished that the objective of such statute or rule was to
deliberately inflict severe harm or suffering on a particular per-
son or group of persons based on race, religion, national origin,
or political opinion .
The House Report indicated that applying the "persecution" provisions
of the Amendment should be made on a case-by-case basis in accor-
dance with U.S. case law as well as international material such as the
opinions of the Nuremberg tribunals. The Report added that the
Amendment would further well-recognized principles of international
law and that its application should not be precluded simply because it
may necessitate difficult determinations.68
Perhaps the most significant case to examine the persecution stan-
dard is Fedorenko v. United States.69 In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court
examined whether involuntary service as a Nazi concentration camp
guard constituted persecution for purposes of the Displaced Persons Act.
The Court indicated that determinations of persecution should not focus
on the voluntariness of the action since the Displaced Persons Act con-
tained no such requirement. Rather, the Court focused on whether
particular conduct can be considered assisting in the persecution of ci-
vilians:
Thus, an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female
inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have as-
sisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there
can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform and
armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was
regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a
nearby village, and who admitted to shooting at escaping in-
mates on orders from the commandant of the camp, fits within
the statutory language about persons who assisted in the perse-
cution of civilians. Other cases may present more difficult line-
drawing problems but we need decide only this case.70
67. Id.
68. Id. at 4707.
69. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
70. Id. at 514.
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Several lower courts have applied the Fedorenko analysis in interpreting
the persecution standard of the Holtzman Amendment.7 ' However, they
have produced conflicting results. Some courts have determined that an
individual need not actively or personally participate in persecution to
be deportable under the Holtzman Amendment.72 Other courts have de-
termined that an individual must personally participate or provide active
assistance in persecutorial acts in order to be deportable under the
Holtzman Amendment.73
As to specific acts that constitute persecution, most courts define
persecution as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ
(in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.,
74
Such acts as support of terrorism or participating in the detention of in-
dividuals who will be tortured have been found to constitute
persecution. However, the harm or suffering caused by persecution need
not be physical. Congress has indicated that persecution may take other
forms, "such as the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvan-
tage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other
essentials of life.,
75
Numerous cases have addressed the persecution standard in the
context of the Nazi persecution statutes. In contrast, only a handful of
cases have examined an alien's participation in persecution in non-Nazi
cases. 76 These cases have generally examined whether an alien's partici-
pation in persecution precludes his eligibility for asylum.
71. See generally, K. Lesli Ligorner, Nazi Concentration Camp Guard Service Equals
"Good Moral Character?": United States v. Lindert, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145
(1997); Kirsten Swisher, Justice Delayed: The Role of Equitable Considerations in the De-
naturalization and Deportation of Nazi War Collaborators, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 415 (1993);
Elliott Abramson, Reflections on the Unthinkable: Standards Relating to the Denaturaliza-
tion and Deportation of Nazis and Those Who Collaborated with the Nazis During World
War 11, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1311 (1989).
72. See Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d
1253 (7th Cir. 1991); Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Kairys,
782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1986); Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1986); Maikovskis
v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985).
73. See Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1991); Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d
1427 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985).
74. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969).
75. H.R. REP. No. 95-1452, 95th Cong. 2, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4700, 4704.
76. See Riad v. INS, 161 F.3d 14 (9th Cir. 1998) (former general in the Egyptian mili-
tary found ineligible for asylum, withholding of deportation, suspension of deportation and
voluntary departure); Han v. INS, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3854 (9th Cir. 1997) (former mem-
ber of South Korean security forces ineligible for asylum or withholding of deportation);
McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986) (member of the Provisional Irish Republican
Army found ineligible for withholding of deportation).
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One of the few decisions that addressed persecution in a non-Nazi
case is In the Matter of Ofosu. Kwadwo Ofosu was a citizen of Ghana
seeking political asylum and withholding of return. At an exclusion
hearing, Ofosu disclosed that he had worked for the Ghanian govern-
ment as a member of the Committee for Defense of the Revolution
(hereinafter "CDR"), a quasi-police force. Although he participated in
arresting political opponents, Ofosu denied having killed or tortured any
detainee. Indeed, he claimed to oppose the repressive efforts of the
CDR. Ofosu admitted, however, that most people arrested by the CDR
were often tortured or killed due to their political beliefs. The Board of
Immigration Appeals, a U.S. Magistrate and a federal district court
judge each found that Ofosu had committed acts of persecution, thereby
precluding immigration relief. According to the district court:
The Report finds, and I agree, that the statute barring persecu-
tors does not merely bar the trigger-pullers and torturers. The
machinery of persecution requires as its foot soldier the arrest-
ing officer, and so long as that officer knows the likely
consequences of his actions, he cannot find sanctuary in the
United States under color of its protections for the persecuted.
Arrest of persons the petitioner believed would be killed or tor-
tured (or merely imprisoned indefinitely without trial) on
account of their political actions constitutes persecution of the
kind Congress considered sufficiently abhorrent to disqualify an
applicant for refugee status."
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that Ofosu's case did not fit
44 78
"neatly" into the statutory provisions set forth in the immigration code.
The Court noted it had never addressed the meaning of the phrase
"ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in ... persecution"
as employed in the exception to the definition of a refugee, or as em-
ployed in the exception to the statutory eligibility of an alien for the
withholding of return. Indeed, the Court referred to a letter issued by the
Special Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the case which
indicated that published authority addressing the issue would be ex-
tremely useful. 7' The Court also noted that an interpretation of the
pertinent language on persecution would be beneficial. Accordingly, the
Court granted a stay of exclusion and deportation subject to the condi-
tion that Ofosu surrender to the custody of the INS. It would then
consider Ofosu's petition with respect to the persecution standard.
77. In the Matter of Kwadwo Ofosu, 933 F.Supp. 237, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
78. Ofosu v. McElroy, 98 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 1996).
79. Id. at 701.
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Subsequent hearings were never held in the case because Ofosu fled
prior to his surrender to the INS.
Given the limited exposure U.S. courts have had to persecution in
non-Nazi cases, it may be worthwhile to review Canada's experiences in
pursuing modern day perpetrators of human rights violations. In 1987,
Canada adopted legislation that precludes admission to persons who
have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.0 In 1993, the
legislation was expanded to prohibit the admission of senior members of
regimes known for widespread human rights abuses.8 ' In 1996, a Mod-
ern War Crimes Unit was established within the Canadian Department
of Citizenship and Immigration to track modem day perpetrators of hu-
man rights violations8 2
80. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s. 19(l)(j). This provision precludes admission to persons who
there are reasonable grounds to believe have committed an act or omission outside Canada
that constituted a war crime or a crime against humanity. In 1989, legislation was enacted to
exclude a person from refugee status if the person had committed a war crime or crimes
against humanity. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s. 46.01(l)(e)(ii).
81. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s. 19(l)(1). This provision precludes persons who are or were
senior members of or senior officials in the service of a government that is or was, in the
opinion of the Minister, engaged in terrorism, systematic or gross human rights violations or
war crimes or crimes against humanity. The term "senior members" is defined as persons
who, by virtue of the position they hold or have held, are or were able to exert a significant
influence on the exercise of government power and, without limiting its generality, includes:
(a) heads of state or government; (b) members of the cabinet or governing council; (c) senior
advisors to persons described in paragraph (a) or (b); (d) senior members of the public serv-
ice; (e) senior members of the military and of the intelligence and internal security apparatus;
(f) ambassadors and senior diplomatic officials; and members of the judiciary. R.S.C. 1985,
c. 1-2, s. 19(1.1).
82. The Canadian government recently issued the following statistics with respect to its
own investigations of modern day war criminals in Canada:
IMMIGRATION CASES (OVERSEAS)
Cases under investigation 96
Immigrant cases refused pursuant to 19(l)(j) or (1) 23
Visitor cases refused pursuant to 19(l)(j) or (1) 16
Cases refused on other grounds 302
Total Cases Overseas 437
REFUGEE CLAIMANTS CASES (IN CANADA)
Cases under investigation 12
Cases with insufficient evidence to proceed 1,048
Cases in which Minister intervened 82
Cases excluded 190
Cases found not to be refugees for other reasons 63
Cases not excluded and found to be refugees 25
Cases withdrawn or abandoned 29
Total refugee claimant cases in Canada 1,449
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In reviewing cases involving modem day human rights violations,
Canadian courts have held that persons who personally committed war
crimes or crimes against humanity are ineligible for immigration relief.83
In these cases, "personal involvement in persecutorial acts must be es-
tablished" and "complicity rests in such cases ... on the existence of a
shared common purpose and the knowledge that all of the parties in
question may have of it."'84 In contrast, the courts have distinguished
between two types of cases where persons did not personally commit
war crimes or crimes against humanity but were members in an organi-
zation that did. Specifically, courts conduct:
(a) an assessment of the nature of the organization and whether
it can be said that it is "directed to a limited brutal purpose;"
and
(b) an assessment of the individual's involvement with the or-
ganization and whether he was a member or had the kind of
involvement with it from which it can be inferred that he shared
the group's common purpose."
Thus, Canadian courts have distinguished between persons who are
members of organizations that are specifically devoted to committing
atrocities in a widespread manner, such as death squads, and persons
who are members of organizations that commit atrocities incidentally to
their primary function, such as the military or police.
In addition, Canadian courts have held that the standard of proof in
determining whether a person has committed a war crime or a crime
against humanity is lower than the usual civil standard.86 Indeed, the
courts have indicated that the standard of proof is well below that
IMMIGRANT CASES (IN CANADA)
Cases under investigation 153
Cases with insufficient evidence 17
Cases described by an adjudicator (immigration judge) 16
Cases not described by an adjudicator (immigration judge) 7
Cases pending before an adjudicator (immigration judge) 18
Total Immigrant Cases in Canada 211
See Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Canada's War Crimes Program: Annual
Report 1998-1999 (1999).
83. Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 89 D.L.R. 4th 173,
175-177 (1992).
84. Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 107 D.L.R. 4th 424,
441 (1993).
85. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Hajialikhani, 83 A.C.W.S. 3d 462
(1998).
86. Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 107 D.L.R. 4th at
Michigan Journal of International Law
required under either the criminal law (beyond a reasonable doubt) or
the civil law (on balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence.)
IV. A PROPOSAL TO PRECLUDE IMMIGRATION RELIEF To ALIENS WHO
COMMIT GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
While the Immigration and Nationality Act precludes any form of
immigration relief to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who
committed acts of genocide, there are no comparable restrictions on ali-
ens who have committed other gross violations of human rights such as
acts of slavery, torture, extrajudicial killing, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity.
Perpetrators of gross human rights violations appear to be eligible
for limited forms of immigration relief. At present, these aliens can be
excluded or deported only if they fall within the general class of exclud-
able or deportable aliens. Theoretically, a perpetrator of human rights
abuses could be found excludable under one of the following classes:
crimes involving moral turpitude; terrorist activities; foreign policy con-
sequences; membership in a totalitarian party; or misrepresentation." In
practice, however, no reported cases have determined conclusively that
an alien who commits human rights abuses is ineligible for admission
under any of these classes .8 In addition, aliens who have ordered, in-
cited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, national origin, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion are only ineligible for some forms of
immigration relief.8 9 Moreover, the Attorney General retains discretion-
87. Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (acts of moral turpi-
tude); Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (terrorist activity);
Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (foreign policy consequences);
Section 212(a)(2)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (membership in totalitarian
party); Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (misrepresentation).
For the apparent preclusion of a Chilean national for alleged human rights violations, see
Michael Janofsky, Chilean Equestrian Sued in U.S. Court, N.Y. 'TMES, Aug. 15, 1987, at
A48; Michael Janofsky, Visa Denial: A Basic Conflict, N.Y. TmEs, Aug. 14, 1987, at B14.
88. In Riad v. INS, the Ninth Circuit seemed to indicate that an alien lacks good moral
character when they have participated in persecution. See supra note 76, at 5. The only other
reported cases that have made this determination involved former Nazis. See United States v.
Dercacz, 530 F.Supp. 1348, 1353 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Linnas, 527 F.Supp. 426,
440 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518
F.Supp. 1362, 1383 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982).
89. At present, aliens who have ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in
the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion are ineligible for the following forms of immigration
relief: political asylum (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)); withholding of removal on grounds of
anticipated persecution (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)); eligibility for temporary resident status
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ary authority to waive limitations that would otherwise bar such indi-
viduals from gaining immigration relief.90 Interestingly, the United
States faced a similar situation prior to 1978, when the Immigration and
Nationality Act did not specifically preclude all forms of immigration
relief to aliens who had participated in Nazi persecution.
Indeed, Congress continues to deal with human rights violations in a
haphazard manner. For example, Congress recently adopted the Interna-
tional Religious Freedom Act. The Act added a new category of
inadmissibility to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Specifically,
Section 212(a)(2)(G) provides "[a]ny alien who, while serving as a for-
eign government official, was responsible for or directly carried out, at
any time during the preceding 24-month period, particularly severe vio-
lations of religious freedom, as defined in section 3 of the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998, and the spouse and children, if any are
inadmissible. "9' The term "particularly severe violations of religious
freedom" is defined as:
systematic, ongoing egregious violations of religious freedom,
including violations such as-
(A) torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment;
(B) prolonged detention without charges;
(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or
clandestine detention of those persons; or
(8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(4)(C)). In addition, the spouse or children of an alien who has been
granted asylum may not accompany the principal alien if it is determined that they partici-
pated in acts of persecution (8 C.F.R. § 208.19(a)(1)).
90. Aliens who committed acts of persecution appear to be eligible for several forms of
immigration relief. Section 212(d)(1) authorizes the Attorney General to waive inadmissibil-
ity in the case of a nonimmigrant described in Section 101(a)(15)(S). Section 212(d)(3)
authorizes the Attorney General to waive inadmissibility of any alien except those aliens who
are ineligible under Section 212(a)(3)(A),(C), or (E). Section 237(a)(l)(H) authorizes the
Attorney General to waive deportation for aliens who misrepresented a material fact in
seeking immigration documentation. Section 240B authorizes the Attorney General to grant
an alien, who is subject to removal proceedings, the right of voluntary departure in lieu of
being subject to proceedings under Section 240, prior to the completion of such proceedings,
or at the conclusion of such proceedings. While aliens who participated in Nazi persecution
or committed acts of genocide are ineligible for these forms of relief, aliens who committed
other acts of persecution appear to be eligible.
In addition, the Attorney General is authorized to waive an alien's ineligibility for ad-
mission insofar as it relates to a single offense of possession of marijuana. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(h). However, no waiver shall be provided in the case of an alien who has been con-
victed or who has admitted committing acts that constitute torture.
91. 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(2)(G) (1998).
Michigan Journal of International Law
(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the secu-
rity of persons."
This provision is unduly restrictive. It should not be limited to foreign
government officials but should apply to all individuals who commit
violations of human rights law. There is no reason to limit these restric-
tions to acts committed in the context of religious persecution. Other
forms of persecution are equally pernicious. The 24-month time limita-
tion for this prohibition is also unnecessary. A perpetrator of human
rights atrocities should not be able to seek absolution by merely waiting
two years after the commission of these acts.
There is little justification for prohibiting all forms of immigration
relief only to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who en-
gaged in acts of genocide. As noted by the findings of a group of
immigration experts established by the 1980 Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy, "an exclusion based simply on Nazi
persecution is too narrow and should be expanded to include a general
bar for all persecution. '" 93 Such action would be consistent with the 1990
Immigration and Nationality Act, which precludes aliens who commit-
ted acts of genocide from seeking immigration relief. It would also be
consistent with congressional efforts to restrict immigration relief to
aliens who commit human rights violations in the context of religious
persecution.94 And, it would be consistent with international law.95
There are several reasons for preventing perpetrators of human
rights violations from receiving immigration relief in the United States.96
92. 22 U.S.C. § 6402(11) (1998).
93. U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Final Report: U.S.
Immigration Policy and the National Interest 757 (1981).
94. See, e.g.. 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(2)(G) (1998).
95. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees provides that its provisions shall
not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against hu-
manity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in
respect of such crimes;
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1951), at Art. I(F). See
also, Guy GOODWIN-GILL, TnE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983). Even crimes
committed out of a genuine political motive will not be considered non-political crimes if
they are disproportionate to the objective or are "of an atrocious or barbarous nature." Id. at
60-61.
96. On the importance of prosecuting human rights violations, see generally, AccouNr-
ABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTs ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Steven R. Ratner and
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First, this action affirms U.S. commitment to human rights and ensures
that human rights violations are not condoned in any way. Indeed, pre-
clusion of immigration benefits sends a powerful message of
condemnation. Second, preclusion of immigration relief punishes per-
petrators of human rights violations. While immigration proceedings are
civil rather than criminal in nature, the denial of immigration relief can
serve as a punitive sanction because it prevents perpetrators from taking
advantage of social, political and economic opportunities in the United
States. 97 Third, this action may deter other human rights abuses. Perpe-
trators must consider the civil, criminal and immigration implications of
their actions. If other countries adopt similar immigration restrictions, it
will significantly isolate perpetrators of human rights violations.
The attached bill (See Appendix 1) would amend portions of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. It would make no changes to existing
provisions that preclude immigration relief to aliens who have participated
in Nazi persecution or who have committed acts of genocide. Rather, it
would extend such proscriptions to aliens who have committed acts of slav-
ery, torture, extrajudicial killing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
other forms of persecution. Such acts are clearly recognized violations of
international law.98  They have been defined by Congress.99
Jason S. Abrams, eds., 1997); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in
International Law, 78 CAL. L. Rav. 449 (1990).
97. Despite this assertion, the denial of immigration benefits is not viewed as punish-
ment by the courts. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Bugajewitz v. Adams,
228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
98. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Annex G.A. Res. 46 (XXXIX 1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March
23, 1976). Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Feb. 2, 1956);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S.
No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
99. The Torture Victim Protection Act provides the following definitions:
(a) EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING.-For the purposes of this Act, the term
"extrajudicial killing" means a deliberated killing not authorized by a
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civi-
lized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that,
under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a
foreign nation.
(b) TORTURE.-For the purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "torture" means any act, directed against an individual in
the offender's custody or physical control, by which severe pain or
Michigan Journal of International Law
They have also been recognized by several federal courts.'°°
Indeed, this legislative proposal complements the existing network
of federal statutes that impose civil and criminal penalties on perpetra-
tors of human rights violations.'0 ' Until such crimes are effectively
prosecuted by international authorities, it is necessary and appropriate
for national legal systems to take action in defense of human rights.' 2
Moreover, such action is consistent with the notion of universal juris-
suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inher-
ent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such pur-
poses as obtaining from that individual or a third person
information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act
that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, intimidating coercing that individual or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused
by or resulting from-
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administra-
tion or application, of mind altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or the
personality.
(C) the threat that another individual will imminently be sub-
jected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration or application of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses
or personality.
See also H.R. REP. No. 367, 102d Cong. 1, pt. 1 (1991). In addition, acts of torture, regard-
less of where they occur, may result in criminal liability. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1998). Criminal
liability has also been established for acts of slavery (18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1998)), war crimes
(18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1998)), and genocide (18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1998)).
100. See generally, Doe v. Unocal, 963 F.Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Filar-
tiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See also, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIms ACT: AN
ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY (Ralph Steinhardt and Anthony D'Amato eds., 1999); Ryan
Goodman and Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and
Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463 (1997); Ralph Steinhardt, Fulfilling the
Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Mar-
cos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65 (1995).
101. Other human rights violations that may be addressed in this proposed legislation
include arbitrary detention, disappearance, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In
determining which human rights violations should be included in this legislative proposal, it
is important to identify violations that are clearly defined and that have been recognized by
Congress and the courts. Otherwise, it will be difficult to garner congressional support for
such legislation. See Hunting Witches at the Border Again, N.Y TYMEs, July 30, 1978, § IV at
22, col. 1; A New Congressional Witch Hunt, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
102. See William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: Towards
a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARv. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming
2000).
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diction-some violations of international law are so egregious that all
states have an obligation to respond.' °3 While universal jurisdiction has
generally been applied in the context of criminal prosecution for certain
violations of international law, the principles underlying this doctrine
are equally applicable in the civil context including the preclusion of
immigration relief. 104
The proposed legislation would amend two sections of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. First, Section 212(a)(3)(E) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act would be amended to preclude admis-
sion to aliens who commit gross human rights violations. Second,
Section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act would be
amended to order deportation of aliens who commit such acts. The re-
maining sections of the Act would incorporate these changes by
reference. Therefore, no additional amendments are necessary. In order
to be effective, these restrictions must apply to offenses committed be-
fore, on, or after, the enactment of this legislation.
While the Nazi persecution and genocide provisions do not pro-
vide any possibility of waiver, it may be beneficial, in very limited
cases, to provide some form of discretionary relief.0 5 For example,
discretionary relief may be necessary to allow aliens to provide in-
formation or testimony to law enforcement authorities or in judicial
proceedings. Discretionary relief may also be necessary in cases where
aliens will provide testimony in prominent cases abroad but require
protection against reprisals as a condition for their testimony. Indeed,
the Immigration and Nationality Act already provides the Attorney Gen-
eral with discretion to waive inadmissibility in cases involving the
national interest. 1 6 The Canadian government recognizes a similar
103. See generally, Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law,
66 ThxAs L. REv. 785 (1988); Rena Hozore Reiss, The Extradition of John Demjanjuk: War
Crimes, Universality Jurisdiction, and the Political Offense Doctrine, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
281, 296-307 (1987).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 cmt. b (1987).
105. But see 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(d)(5)(A). The Attorney General may authorize parole into
the United States, on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit, to any alien applying for admission to the United States. Such parole is not
regarded as an admission of the alien. When the purposes of such parole have been served,
the Attorney General may order the parole terminated and the alien returned. See id. It is
conceivable that the Attorney General could use this provision to authorize parole into the
United States of an alien who participated in acts of Nazi persecution or genocide.
106. Section 212(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act allows the Attorney Gen-
eral to waive inadmissibility with respect to a nonimmigrant as set forth in Section
101(a)(15)(S) if the Attorney General considers it to be in the national interest to do so. Sec-
tion 101(a)(15)(S) provides in pertinent part:
Michigan Journal of International Law
exception. A separate concern involves cases where an alien may be
subject to torture if they are deported or extradited to another country. In
these cases, the United States should not deport or extradite the affected
alien.'O8 Rather, it should prosecute these individuals. This is consistent
with the longstanding doctrine aut dedere aut judicare-extradite or
prosecute.'"9 If a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility is to be recog-
an alien-
(i) who the Attorney General determines-
(1) is in possession of critical reliable information concerning a crimi-
nal organization or enterprise;
(11) is willing to supply or has supplied such information to Federal or
State law enforcement authorities or a Federal or State court; and
(111) whose presence in the United States the Attorney General deter-
mines is essential to the success of an organized criminal
investigation or the successful prosecution of an individual in-
volved in the criminal organization or enterprise; or
(ii) who the Secretary of State and the Attorney General jointly determine-
(I) is in possession of critical reliable information concerning a ter-
rorist organization, enterprise, or operation;
(I) is willing to supply or has supplied such information to Federal
law enforcement authorities or a Federal court;
(III) will be or has been placed in danger as a result of providing such
information; and
(IV) is eligible to receive a reward under Section 36(a) of the State De-
partment Basic Authorities Act of 1956,
and, if the Attorney General (or with respect to clause (ii), the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General jointly) consider it to be appropriate, the spouse, married
and unmarried sons and daughters, and parents of an alien described in clause (i)
or (ii) if accompanying, or following to join, the alien.
107. In Canada, the Minister of Immigration has the authority to issue a written permit
authorizing any person to come into or remain in Canada. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s.37. The
Minister may cancel this permit at any time. In addition, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s.19(l)(l) pro-
vides that no person shall be granted admission who is a member of any of the following
classes: "persons who are or were senior members of or senior officials in the service of a
government that is or was, in the opinion of the Minister, engaged in terrorism, systematic or
gross human rights violations or war crimes or crimes against humanity within the meaning
of subsection 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code, except persons who have satisfied the Minister
that their admission would not be detrimental to the national interest." (emphasis added)
108. Article 3 of the Torture Convention provides "[n]o State Party shall expel, return
("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. See generally, Terry
Coonan, Refoulement on the High Seas, 63 U. CaN. L. Rav. 1241 (1995); Harold Koh, The
Haitian Centers Council Case: Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35
H.xv. INT'L L.J. 1, (1994); Robert L. Newmark, Non-Refoulement Run Afoul: The Question-
able Legality of Extraterritorial Repatriation Programs, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 833 (1993).
109. See Lee A. Steven, Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the
United States is in Breach of Its International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 425 (1999);
William M. Cohen, Implementing the Torture Convention in U.S. Extradition Cases, 26
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 517 (1998); M. CHERIF BAssiouNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 5-11 (3rd ed. 1997).
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nized, Sections 212(d) and 101(a)(15)(S) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act would have to be amended.
In addition to this proposed legislation, immigration forms and pro-
cedures must also be revised. Currently, an alien who has committed
serious violations of human rights is not required to disclose this infor-
mation on the Nonimmigrant Visa Application or on the Nonimmigrant
Visa Waiver Form.Y° While the Application for Immigrant Visa and
Alien Registration requires aliens to disclose whether they have com-
mitted crimes involving moral turpitude, the courts have not ruled
definitively that human rights violations constitute crimes involving
moral turpitude. Accordingly, visa application forms must be amended
to require aliens to indicate whether they have committed any violations
of human rights."'
Strong institutional mechanisms must be established to implement
this proposed legislation. At present, there does not appear to be any
agency within the Department of Justice with the specific mandate of
identifying, investigating and prosecuting modem day perpetrators of
human rights atrocities. The importance of establishing a separate
agency for this function can be seen in the experiences of the Office of
On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed into law a bill that requires U.S. govern-
ment agencies to prescribe regulations that would implement Article 3 of the Torture
Convention. See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Public Law 105-
277. As a result, both the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of
State promulgated regulations to implement Article 3 of the Torture Convention. These
regulations prohibit deportation to any country where an alien may face torture. See 8 C.F.R.
Parts 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240, 241, and 253; 22 C.F.R. Part 95.
110. Over 50% of nonimmigrant visitors who enter the United States at air or sea ports-
of-entry apply for admission under the Visa Waiver Program. In 1996 alone, approximately
12 million aliens entered the United States under this program. The United States is also
increasing the number of countries eligible for the Visa Waiver Program. Accordingly, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service has expressed some concern about the use of the
Visa Waiver Program. See Statement of Walter D. Cadman, supra note 40.
111. Recent efforts to improve data acquisition concerning the entry and departure of
aliens have met with some difficulty. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act required the Attorney General to develop an automated entry and exit
control system within two years. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act § 110, 8 U.S.C. § 1221 note (1998). Specifically, the system must be capable of:
(1) recording the departure of every alien from the United States and matching the record of
departure with the record of the alien's arrival in the United States; and (2) enabling the
Attorney General to identify nonimmigrant aliens who remain in the United States beyond
the period authorized by the Attorney General. Several members of Congress expressed
concern that the proposed system would cause burdensome and unnecessary delays at border
crossings throughout the United States. See Impact of Entry-Exit System on U.S. Border:
Hearings on S.1360 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Senate Comm. On the Judi-
ciary, 105th Cong., 4 (1997). In 1998, Congress extended the deadline for implementing the
INS system to March 30, 2001. See Section 116 of the Department of Justice Appropriations
Act of 1999, as contained in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Ap-
propriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
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Special Investigations. Indeed, the OSI provides an excellent model. Its
methodology for pursuing Nazi war criminals can be applied with equal
rigor to other perpetrators of human rights violations. To be effective,
however, this agency must be closely aligned with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The importance of strong interagency coordina-
tion and prompt action can be seen in the experiences of the Canadian
government. As noted by the Canadian Department of Justice, "[e]arly
action by the government, particularly through screening abroad and
exclusion proceedings ... [has] proven to be the most effective means
of dealing with these cases.""'2
Throughout implementation, efforts must be taken to ensure that ali-
ens are provided with adequate due process protection. For example,
sufficient evidence must exist before an alien is placed on a watch list.
At present, no person may be placed on a watch list unless they are in-
admissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act." ' Even more
exacting standards must be met before an individual can be denied a visa
or otherwise denied admission into the United States. At each stage, in-
dividuals must be given an opportunity to challenge any alleged
charges." 14 The purpose of this legislative proposal is not to make it
more difficult for legitimate immigrants and refugees to enter the United
States. The United States has benefited greatly from maintaining open
borders and welcoming immigrants from around the world. It also has a
responsibility to protect legitimate refugees fleeing war and persecution.
Rather, this legislative proposal seeks to limit the ability of perpetrators
of human right atrocities from entering our society.
Finally, courts should look to national and international case law for
guidance in interpreting and applying this proposed legislation. Existing
national case law can provide appropriate guidance on such issues as the
definition of persecution. In addition to Nazi persecution jurisprudence,
numerous cases have been filed under the Alien Tort Statute and the
more recent Torture Victim Protection Act.' Existing international case
law can also provide appropriate guidance to U.S. courts. Recent deci-
sions by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
112. Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Canada's War Crimes Program:
Annual Report 1998-1999 (1999).
113. See Visa Lookout Systems in notes accompanying 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1998).
114. In dissenting opinions, several federal judges have expressed concern about en-
suring that due process protections apply in these sensitive cases. See United States v.
Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 302, 328 (3rd. Cir. 1996) (Aldisert, J., dissenting); Kalejs v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 10 F.3d 441,452 (7th Cir. 1993) (Eisele, J., dissenting). See
also, John W. Heath, Jr., Journey Over "Strange Ground:" From Demjanjuk to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court Regime, 13 GEO. ImNMGR. L.J. 383 (1999).
115. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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and Rwanda have clarified the definitions of war crimes and crimes
against humanity."6 These existing standards would reduce uncertainty
in the implementation and application of this new legislation.
CONCLUSION
This article proposes amending the Immigration and Nationality Act
to prohibit all forms of immigration relief to aliens who have committed
acts of slavery, torture, extrajudicial killing, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or other forms of persecution. This legislation is patterned
after, and meant to complement, existing provisions concerning aliens
who participated in Nazi persecution or who engaged in acts of geno-
cide. In addition to the proposed legislation, this Article suggests that
immigration procedures must be revised to facilitate the prompt identifi-
cation of aliens who have committed human rights atrocities. A separate
agency should also be established with broad authority to investigate
and prosecute these cases.
The goals of this proposed legislation are twofold: to ensure that ali-
ens seeking the benefits of U.S. immigration relief are worthy recipients
and to affirm U.S. commitment to the protection of human rights. As
noted by a former Director of the Office of Special Investigations:
[b]y revoking citizenship, the polity-the American people
joined together in a society and a government-takes the most
solemn and drastic step available to it: the civil equivalent of
excommunication. Citizenship is the most fundamental right ac-
corded to any member of the polity; its revocation is a highly
unusual and difficult procedure, and it represents the judgment
of the polity that the individual does not share its commitment
to the basic values on which the society is founded." 7
Indeed, if other countries provide comparable immigration restrictions,
it will send a powerful message of condemnation that violations of hu-
man rights are unacceptable and will not be tolerated by any civilized
nation.
As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Holtzman Amendment,
it is appropriate to recall the underlying goals of this important legisla-
tion: "to serve as a clear reaffirmation of this country's commitment to
the most basic of human rights-that is, the right to live one's life and
116. See Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed on the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996).
117. Ryan, supra note 14, at 340.
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practice one's beliefs without the fear of persecution.""' 8 The attached
legislative proposal would further these noble goals.
118. 124 CoNG. REc. H31646, H31647 (Sept. 26, 1978).
[Vol. 20:657
Summer 1999] Using Immigration Law to Protect Human Rights
APPENDIX 1
PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Human Rights and Immigration Act
of 1999."
SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT
(A) Inadmissibility.
Section 212(a)(3)(E) is amended to read as follows:
(E) Participants in Nazi persecution, genocide, or other
forms of persecution.
(iii) Any alien who has committed any of the follow-
ing acts is inadmissible: slavery, torture,
extrajudicial killing, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity.
(B) Removability.
Section 237(a)(4)(D) is amended to read as follows:
(D) Participants in Nazi persecution, genocide, or other
forms of persecution.
Any alien described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of section
212(a)(3)(E) is deportable.
SECTION 3. EFFECTIVE DATE
The amendments made by this Act shall apply to offenses
committed before, on, or after the enactment of this Act.
Michigan Journal of International Law
POSTSCRIPT
Following completion of this article, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
and Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI) introduced legislation in the United
States Senate that would preclude immigration relief to aliens who
commit acts of torture."9 The Anti-Atrocity Deportation Act (S.1375)
amends the Immigration and Nationality Act "to provide that aliens who
commit acts of torture abroad are inadmissible and removable and to
establish within the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice an
Office of Special Investigations having responsibilities under that Act
with respect to all alien participants in acts of genocide and torture
abroad."
20
Upon submitting the bill to the U.S. Senate, Senator Leahy indi-
cated that "we should not repeat the mistake of waiting decades before
tracking down war criminals and human rights abusers who have settled
in this country. War criminals should find no sanctuary in loopholes in
our current immigration policies and enforcement."' 2' Interestingly, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service has also proposed the develop-
122
ment of new rules and institutions to respond to human rights abusers.
The Leahy proposal reads as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act".
SECTION 2. INADMISSIBILITY AND REMOVABILITY OF
ALIENS WHO HAVE COMMITTED ACTS OF TORTURE
ABROAD.
(a) Inadmissibility. Section 212(a)(3)(E) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(E)) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
119. See Robert L. Jackson, Setting Up a System to Pursue Alleged War Criminals in
U.S., L.A. 'IrMEs, Aug. 17, 1999, at A5; Sam Skolnik, Leahy Proposes Expanding OSI'S
Jurisdiction To Include Acts of Torture, LEGAL Tnh4s, July 26, 1999, at 1; Steve Fainaru,
Leahy Wants U.S. Anti-Nazi Unit To Eye Other Alleged War Crimes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 17,
1999, at A6.
120. S.1375, 106th Cong. (1999). On July 29, 1999, Representative Robert Franks (R-
NJ) introduced the Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act in the House of Representatives as
H.R. 2642. H.R. 2642, 106th Cong. (1999).
121. 145 CONG. REc. 8631, 8636.
122. See Steve Fainaru, INS Moves to Track Down Rights Abusers, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 20, 1999, at Al.
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"(iii) Commission of acts of torture. Any alien who, outside
the United States, has committed any act of torture, as de-
fined in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code, is
inadmissible.".
(b) Removability. Section 237(a)(4)(D) of that Act (8 U.S.C.
1227(a)(4)(D)) is amended by striking "clause (i) or (ii)"
and inserting "clause (i), (ii), or (iii)".
(c) Effective Date. The amendments made by this section shall
apply to offenses committed before, on, or after the date of
enactment of this Act.
SECTION 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS.
(a) Amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Sec-
tion 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1103) is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(g) The Attorney General shall establish within the Crimi-
nal Division of the Department of Justice an Office of
Special Investigations with the authority of investigating,
and, where appropriate, taking legal action to remove, de-
naturalize, or prosecute any alien found to be in violation of
clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of section 212(a)(3)(E).".
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.
(1) In general. There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Department of Justice for the fiscal year 2000 such
sums as may be necessary to carry out the additional
duties established under section 103(g) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (as added by this Act) in
order to ensure that the Office of Special Investiga-
tions fulfills its continuing obligations regarding Nazi
war criminals.
(2) Availability of funds. Amounts appropriated pursuant
to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available un-
til expended.
While the Leahy proposal addresses the principal concerns raised in
this Article, its provisions should not be limited to aliens who have
committed acts of torture. At a minimum, the Leahy proposal should be
Michigan Journal of International Law
extended to include aliens who committed acts of slavery, extrajudicial
killing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Indeed, if the United
States is determined to prevent perpetrators of human rights violations
from entering its territory, the Leahy proposal should be extended to
include aliens who commit other forms of persecution including arbi-
trary detention, forced disappearance, or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment.123 Finally, the Leahy proposal should recognize an extremely
narrow exception for those cases where entry of an otherwise inadmissi-
ble alien is in the greater interests of justice.
123. These practices are clearly recognized as violations of jus cogens norms. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, at § 703. A
jus cogens norm is a peremptory norm accepted and recognized by the international commu-
nity from which no derogation is permitted. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 97
(4th ed. 1997); J. SZTUCKI, Jus COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES (1974).
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